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Learning Object Relationships which determine the Outcomeof Actions
Severin Fichtl1,John Alexander1, Dirk Kraft2,Jimmy Alison Jorgensen2,Norbert Krüger2∗,Frank Guerin1†
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AbstractInfants extend their repertoire of behaviours from initially simple behaviours with singleobjects to complex behaviours dealing with spatial relationships among objects. We areinterested in the mechanisms underlying this development in order to achieve similar de-velopmen in artificial systems. One mechanism is sensorimotor differentiation, which allowsone behaviour to become altered in order to achieve a different result; the old behaviouris not forgotten, so differentiation increases the number of available behaviours. Differen-tiation requires the learning of both sensory abstractions and motor programs for the newbehaviour; here we focus only on the sensory aspect: learning to recognise situations inwhich the new behaviour succeeds. We experimented with learning these situations in arealistic physical simulation of a robotic manipulator interacting with various objects, wherethe sensor space includes the robot arm position data and a Kinect-based vision system.The mechanism for learning sensory abstractions for a new behaviour is a component in thelarger enterprise of building systems which emulate the mechanisms of infant development.
KeywordsDevelopmental Artificial Intelligence · Vision · Infant Development · Means-end Behaviour· Learning Preconditions
1. Introduction
In the period from six months of age through to two years, hu-man infants undergo significant development in their skills andunderstanding relating to physical world objects and their ma-nipulation. At six months they mostly deal with only one objectat a time, performing simple actions such as sucking or bang-ing; by two years they are capable of solving relatively com-plex problems which require them to put multiple objects in aspatial relationship, for example using simple tools. We areinterested in building artificial systems which could mimic themechanisms underlying infants’ development of these skills and
∗E-mail: norbert@mmmi.sdu.dk†E-mail: f.guerin@abdn.ac.uk
thereby achieve some understanding of the physical world. In asurvey of this development, we have outlined six of these mech-anisms [1], and the present paper (focussing on one mechanism)is part of the endeavour to create a complete working imple-mentation of these mechanisms in an agent which could exhibitautonomous development through embodiment in a robot.
Observations of infants show that, at any particular age, theypossess a repertoire of behaviours or manual skills which theyapply to various objects or surfaces they encounter [2, 3]. Eachsuch behaviour could be seen as roughly analogous to a plan-ning operator in Artificial Intelligence, because there are situa-tions which make them likely to be executed (like the precondi-tion of a planning operator), and expected effects (postcondition),as well as some motor control program describing the behaviourexecuted. Piagetian theory calls such units schemas, and weuse this terminology here; other psychologists have similar units
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called “sensorimotor processes” [4], “skills” [5], or “perception-action routines” [3]. The repertoire of schemas which infantspossess by two years is much larger and more sophisticatedthan the repertoire they have at six months. The focus of ourwork is on how new schemas are acquired. Within this problemthere are the problems of identifying when a new schema shouldbe created, and then learning new precondition, postcondition,and motor program for the new schema. In this paper, we fo-cus on learning the precondition for a new schema. This is aparticularly interesting problem in the case of “means-end be-haviours”; these are problem solving situations where the infantcannot immediately achieve its goal, and so must sequence twoactions, where the first facilitates the next [6], for example a toymay be obstructed by a box, and the infant may need to pushthe box out of the way before being able to take possession ofthe toy. Figure 1 illustrates such a situation.
Figure 1. This figure on the left illustrates a situation where an infant desiresa toy which is obstructed by a box. The figure on the right showsthe same situation after the infant removed the box and is now ableto retrieve the desired toy.
Piaget believed that it is through learning means-end be-haviours that infants begin to learn about important spatial rela-tionships between objects [7]. The precondition of a schema (fora means-end behaviour) must capture the spatial relationshipbetween objects which determines where the behaviour worksor does not work. In learning preconditions the infant is learn-ing new important abstractions over its sensor space. This canchange how an infant understands a scene because the infantcan begin to see things at a higher level of abstraction, notic-ing precisely those spatial relationships which are important indetermining what object manipulations are possible (by itself orother agents). This is an important part of the development ofan understanding of the world.Both, sensory and motor aspects are crucial aspects of infancyand ongoing development in general. These aspects are verymuch intertwined in humans. In computational systems, sensoryand motor aspects can also influence and bootstrap each other;however, unlike biological systems, artificial systems can choose
to focus on either one independently. In this work we focuson the sensory part, but we also investigate the motor side inparallel in our research group.In this work we experimented with the following two means-endbehaviours: (i) pushing aside an obstacle to see if it would con-vert an obstructed scenario to and unobstructed one; (ii) pullinga supporting object to bring the supported object into reach (i.e.to bring the object on top into reach as in Fig. 2). In eachcase, we investigate how well we can learn the preconditionsdescribing the spatial relationship among a pair of objects whichdetermines whether or not the means-end behaviour will work.We did this using an agent which controls a simulated robot armwith 6 Degrees of Freedom in a physically realistic 3D World,and a Kinect-based vision system. For this vision system wealso simulate the Kinect, including the noise of real Kinect de-vices. Of course it would be relatively easy for a programmerto simply code in the required spatial relationship so that anagent would not have to learn it, however our aim is to constructan agent which can learn world knowledge for itself. Such anagent should hopefully be able to extend its own knowledge, andlearn things the designer might not have foreseen the need for.In particular we would like to endow robots with the capabilityto learn about important spatial relationships (determining thesuccess of manipulation actions) which the designer might nothave foreseen the need for. Our analysis of infant development(focussing on interaction with the physical world) [1] suggeststhat infants do possess a differentiation mechanism for spawningnew schemas, and we see this capability as an essential com-ponent of any agent which would be able to display ongoingautonomous development.To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to build anartificial system to tackle the problem of the acquisition of pre-conditions for the two means-end behaviours above (removingthe obstacle, and pulling the support). We believe that gettingrobots to do the kinds of tasks which infants do is an importantarea in developmental robotics because these are tasks whichwe know are part of a developing trajectory, leading to more so-phisticated tasks which build on them. Our results suggest that(1) it is possible for a robotic system to autonomously learn itsown sensor abstractions for new behaviours, and (2) that rapidlearning of these abstractions can be facilitated if the agentadopts an active learning approach to selecting new examples.There is a closely related and recent work by Rosman and Ra-mamoorthy [8] which learns spatial relationships between ob-jects, such as “on” and “adjacent”. However this is learning thespatial relationships in a human-supervised fashion, using hu-mans to pre-label a set of scenes with the object relations seenin the scene. We differ in the philosophy of our approach be-cause we believe that the robot should only learn relationshipswhich are practically meaningful for it (e.g. those relationships
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DIFFERENTIATION
INITIAL SCHEMA NEW SCHEMA
Pulling the cloth/tray toexamine/touch/feel it. Pulling the cloth/tray inorder to get the keys
SENSORIMOTOR
Figure 2. This figure illustrates how a new behaviour can be acquired by the differentiation mechanism. The original behaviour (initial schema) simply pulls acloth/tray in order to bring it close. The new behaviour pulls the cloth/tray in order to bring the item supported by it closer. The new schema acquiredwill need to adjust its motor behaviour, and also to learn the situations in which this new behaviour can be expected to work.
that determine when a behaviour will be successful or not). Incontrast to our work, [8] imposes a concept (e.g. on top) whicha human believes to be useful for a robot, and the particularinstantiation of that concept is decided by the human, ratherthan with reference to the robot’s own action in the world. Weinstead believe that the concepts which will be useful for a robotare likely to be those that emerge from its own interactions withthe world. This is also related to Sutton’s “verification principle”[9, 10]; the relationship our system learns is grounded in its ownexperience, and hence it can always revisit that and relearn it ifnecessary (e.g. if its manipulation ability changes, such that adifferent variant of the relationship is needed now). In contrast,knowledge given by a human is not verifiable by the agent, andis just given as is with no opportunity for adjusting the idea. Inour system training data can be gathered in an online fashionas the robot executes actions and sees the effects, furthermorethe relationships which the robot learns are not limited by thosedecided by a human; whenever the robot needs to find situa-tions in which a means-end behaviour works or does not, it canbegin learning a classifier that will appropriately discriminatethe situations.In Section II, we review the background literature on infants’acquisition of means-end behaviours, to motivate our computa-tional work. Section III gives an overview of our computationalwork and the experiments carried out. Section IV presents the
results of our experiments. Section V discusses the implicationsand significance of these results, and compares with relatedworks. Section VI concludes and outlines directions for futurework.
2. Motivation
Young infants start life with a limited set of repetitive be-haviours, but as they progress through the first two years theirrepertoire of behaviours grows rapidly [1, 2]. The initial be-haviours include “rhythmical stereotypical behaviours” whichare either present at birth or seem to emerge as by-productsof the normal maturation of motor control circuits [11]. Thesebehaviours include “arm waving” (flapping of the arm verticallyfrom the shoulder), bending and extending the wrist, flexion andextension of the fingers, etc. It is surmised that these behavioursmay be opportunistically used by infants for the purpose of boot-strapping further development, for example by encouraging ac-tions which will at some point lead to interesting results. Inaddition to the rhythmical stereotypical behaviours, there arethe basic object behaviours such as looking at an object, andgrasping it, and performing basic actions such as mouthing itor banging it on a surface. These behaviours are typically wellestablished by six months [12, p. 174],[13].
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During the period from 6 to 24 months, there is a rapid growthin the infant’s repertoire of behaviours. Following the terminol-ogy of Piaget [14], we can describe these infant behaviours usingthe term schemas which have roughly the same role as planningoperators in typical AI systems. A schema has a precondition(describing situations where it is expected to be applicable),an action (or motor program), and a prediction (describing theexpected result). The growth in the infant’s behavioural reper-toire can then be described as the addition of new schemas toits repertoire. The addition of schemas may be driven by someunderlying developmental mechanisms [1], one of which is Sen-sorimotor differentiation: When an existing schema is executedand it produces an unexpected result, this can start a processwhich attempts to discover how to reproduce this new result;the process must change both the old motor program as well asthe precondition and prediction of the old schema. Sensorimo-tor differentiation thus describes how one schema can spawn anew schema.An example of this process resulting in the emergence of a newschema has been studied by Willatts [6], who studied the ac-quisition of the schema for pulling a cloth in order to bring anobject resting on it within reach (where grabbing this object isthe goal). Figure 2 illustrates this process. Willatts showedthat during the 6 to 8 months period there is a gradual transi-tion: initially the infant sees the goal (object out of reach) andmeans (cloth), and does not know the possibility for retrieval, sothe infant plays with the means object (cloth) for its own sake,but in grabbing the cloth the object is brought closer. This acci-dental retrieval gradually becomes intentional. Furthermore, by9 months it was shown that infants can adjust the means action(cloth pull) as appropriate to the goal, in situations where thegoal may be far or near. The new pulling behaviour becomesquite different to the original retrieval behaviour; the cloth willbe pulled further, even behind the infant (this is the learning ofa new motor program); furthermore, the infant learns to discrim-inate the situations in which this cloth pulling is likely to work(this is the learning of a new sensor abstraction).A further example which we have investigated concerns removingan obstacle (see also Piaget [2]): A young infant has a behaviourfor waving an object back and forth on a table surface. At somelater point, this behaviour becomes differentiated to produce abehaviour for deliberately displacing an object to one side inorder to retrieve a visible toy behind it (see Figure 1). Again,the new behaviour is different as it becomes tailored to the newgoal, and the situations where it is likely to work are learnt.Piaget believed that it is through learning means-end be-haviours such as these that infants begin to learn about im-portant spatial relationships between objects [7]. This is animportant part of the development of an understanding of theworld because it helps an infant to understand what it observes
at a higher level of abstraction, noticing precisely those spatialrelationships which are important in determining what objectmanipulations are possible (by itself or other agents). The im-portance of these acquisitions for cognitive development moti-vates our interest in attempting to build artificial systems whichcould autonomously make similar acquisitions.
3. System Overview
This section first briefly describes how the system detailed inthis paper fits into the larger enterprise of building artificialsystems which acquire new behaviours following a similar de-velopmental trajectory to infants (Sec. 3.1). Following this wedetail our simulated robotic arm, vision system, and experimen-tal setup (Sec. 3.2, 3.3), followed by the experiments run andthe learning approach used (Sec. 3.4).
3.1. Overview of the Developing System
The work reported in this paper is just one component in ourdeveloping system, which includes mechanisms of developmentallowing new sensorimotor schemas to be added to the infant’srepertoire. We will give a brief overview in order to illustratewhere the precondition learning fits into the full system. Wefirst explain some terms: an “action” in our system is a skilledmotor program which typically achieves some goal, for example,reaching for and picking up any of various objects, or pulling anobject. A “relationship” between objects in this paper refers toa spatial arrangement of the objects; in particular we focus onthe spatial relationship of one being on-top of the other suchthat pulling the lower one will make the upper one also move.Note that we are not interested in the concept “on top” as ahuman adult might think of it, rather we are interested in thespatial relationship which exists if the two objects are to movetogether, so it is a very practical relationship which is groundedin a particular manipulation action. In our system a schema〈prec,M, pred ,G〉 has a precondition prec , a motor programM , a prediction pred , and also a postcondition G (which can beviewed as the goal this individual schema is trying to achieve). Apostcondition (or goal) is necessary so that some schemas knowwhen to terminate, and also because new schemas typically startlife with a new goal and have to tailor their motor and sensoraspects to appropriately serve the goal. On a higher level in theframework, these schemas can be used and put into a sequenceby a planner in order to achieve complex high-level goals. Whenconsidering such a sequence of planned actions, we would referto the “goal” of an individual schema as a “subgoal”. The motorprogram controls the robot arm to achieve this subgoal. Thesimulated infant maintains a library of schemas some of which
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are provided initially, and some of which may subsequently beadded to or modified. The initial schemas include behaviourssuch as look-at, reach, grasp, drop, etc. This is not to suggestthat these behaviours are innate in infants, they are just startingbehaviours for our system; we do not want our system to haveto learn everything which an infant learns, instead we want itto start at a state with some competences/behaviours and thenlearn from there.The agent analyses the current state of the world and pro-duces a planning tree of future possibilities for its own actions;this tree is currently limited to a depth of three, but in the fu-ture this could be changed to a more dynamic depth based onthe accuracies of the schema predictions. The planning treeshows possible chains of actions. To find these, when analysingthe current state, the agent checks for each available schemawhether its precondition is met, i.e. whether it is expected toachieve its goal when executed in the current state, and addsit to the tree if it is expected to be successful. The agent thenuses a schema’s predictor to predict the next state of each addedschema and adds a second layer of actions by analysing the pre-dicted states. This is repeated until the depth limit is reached.The first level of the tree now contains every schema whose pre-condition is satisfied currently; the second level contains everyschema which is predicted to be executable thereafter, and soon.The agent, hence, understands the scene in terms of possibilitieswith regard to existing schemas. Figure 3 illustrates the routinethe agent continuously loops through:
1. Computing the tree of executable schemas, where exe-cutable means they are expected to have a chance toachieve their goal.
2. Selecting one of the first level schemas for execution,where this selection can be random or guided by intrinsicmotivation or a planning algorithm trying to achieve a notdirectly achievable goal.
3. Updating the agent’s knowledge based on the results ofthat execution (which may include the harvesting of a newschema).
If the result of the execution is a slight variation on the predictedresult (slight here means that the subsequent possibilities inthe tree are not affected by this change), then the prediction ofthat schema is updated. However, if the result of the executioncauses an unexpected change in the tree, i.e., changes the fu-ture schema execution possibilities, then a harvesting processis initiated which creates a new schema (the term ‘harvesting’is borrowed from Chaput [15]). This can be illustrated with theexample of the support: before the system knows about themeans-end behaviour of the support it may accidentally pull a
supporting object and thereby cause a formerly unreachable ob-ject to come into reach. This will cause an unexpected changein the tree, because there is now a new object in reach on whichvarious actions (such as grasping) could be performed. hence,the criterion for harvesting has been met. A preliminary versionof this model has been made in a masters thesis [16].Harvesting is the first step in differentiation: it creates a copy ofthe schema which had just been executed, but gives it a differentgoal (to achieve the unexpected result). A goal can be to bringabout a certain (set of) feature(s) in the state space, e.g. to touchor grasp an object. A more difficult goal would be to enable an-other schema, e.g. a goal could be to make an object reachable(which is the case in the harvesting of a schema for the supportmeans-end behaviour). The old schema gets assigned the goalto achieve the previous standard outcome. Based on the newgoal, the new schema then tries to modify its precondition so asto capture the situations in which the new goals can be reliablyachieved; this is the differentiation of the precondition which isthe focus of this paper. The motor program and prediction alsoneed to be differentiated (but this is not tackled in this paper).For learning the motor program, the concept of Goal Babbling[17] may be useful as it allows for a limited type of explorationof motor programs, which is directed towards goals.
Construct Tree of 
Possible Action 
Sequences
And Predict Resulting 
States
Environment
Select 
Schema for 
Execution
Schema 
Library
Schema 1
Schema 2
Schema 3
….
Manage and 
Schema 
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(create new 
schema if 
unexpected 
effect)
Monitor 
Execution
Figure 3. Illustration of the routine the agent continuously loops through: I)Based on the current state of the environment, the agent constructs atree of possible actions II) The agent selects a schema for executionIII) The agent executes the selected schema IV) The harvester moduledecides whether or not to create a new schema, based on the resultof the last execution V) If a new schema was created it is added tothe agent’s schema library
In the current work, we focus on improving and evaluating thisprocess of adjusting the precondition of the new schema basedon ongoing experiences generated from its execution. The prob-
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lem of deciding when to create the new schema was found to bethe easier part in our previous work, and is not addressed here.
3.2. The Simulated Environment
As our robot we use a simulated 6 degrees of freedom armmounted on a table with a two finger gripper as its hand inthe simulator RobWorkSim [18, 19]. In our experiment, we use3 different household objects (see Fig. 4):
1. A simple coffee cup
2. A cereal Box
3. A tray (with a protrusion to facilitate pulling)
Our agent senses its internal state such as robot arm joint an-gles and calculates the position and orientation of its handbased on the joint angles. The full state space consists of thisinternal state space and the external statespace describing theworld the robot is situated in.The internal state space has 13 Dimensions. The first 6 vari-ables describe the joint angles of the robot arm. The second6 variables describe the position and orientation of the handof the robot arm. These 6 variables consist of 3 variables forthe Cartesian position and 3 variables for the orientation of thehand in Roll, Pitch and Yaw values. The second 6 variables arecalculated from the first 6 values. The last variable in the inter-nal state space equates to the openness of the hand’s fingers.Figure 4 shows this state space.In our experiments, we first learnt preconditions using objectposition data directly from the RobWork simulator (i.e. perfectlyaccurate data), then we later used the less perfect data comingfrom our vision system, to see how well the learning systemwould cope with a more realistic noisy input.
3.3. The (Simulated) Vision System
Our robotic system uses a Kinect-based vision system [20] de-veloped at SDU, to extract information about objects in thescene.A Kinect is a 3D scanner camera system developed by Microsoftas motion sensing input device for the Microsoft game consoleXbox 360. It is a popular alternative to expensive stereo camerasystems and provides good results in close range applicationswith up to 3 meters distance from the Kinect device [21].The Kinect system projects an infrared image (invisible for hu-man eyes) over the scene and then takes a picture of the scene.Using its knowledge of the projected infrared image it is ableto calculate an accurate depth map based on the distortion ofthe infrared image. This depth map describes the distance from
the camera of each point of the surfaces visible to the cam-era system. Using the picture of the scene and the depth map,our vision system calculates a 3D point cloud as it is commonamongst state of the art vision systems[22].
Based on this 3D point cloud and the colour information of thescene, our vision system creates surface patches as shown inFigure 4 on the right hand side. There are different layers ofsurface patches. We only use basic layer with surface patcheswhich we call texlets. These texlets describe the surface of thescene with additional information, e.g. not only position in thespace, but also the orientation and colour of the surface [23].
Because we worked with a simulator, we also simulate theKinect system, and included the noise of real Kinect devices.This gives us data about the depth to the objects in our 3Dscene just as we would have obtained from a real Kinect look-ing at a real scene with 3D objects. The data from the simulatedvision system is hence more noisy and less accurate than theperfectly accurate data provided by taking the locations of ob-jects directly from the simulator.
Using different coloured objects for segmentation purposes, thevision system is able to recognise up to five objects and extracttheir centre of gravity positions in relation to the robot arm, andtheir orientation. This is achieved by running PCA over eachobject’s texlet-based representation. Both, position and orien-tation of an object are described by 3 variables each. Thesevariables are X, Y and Z for the position and Roll, Pitch andYaw for the orientation in space. Together with the 13 inter-nal state variables described above in Section 3.2, this gives a43 Dimensional state space, where the 13 internal state vari-ables describe the robot itself and the 5 * 6 = 30 external statevariables describe the configuration of the objects in the robotsview.
Note that none of the values returned by the vision system isperfectly accurate. Centre of gravity is approximate, and orien-tation works best for a long object, but does not give much usefulinformation for a small roundish object like a cup. The differ-ence between the state space based on perfect RobWork dataand the imperfect Vision System data can be clearly seen inFig. 4 (by comparing a value with its corresponding “Rw” valuewritten directly below it). In the remainder of this paper, whentalking about “RobWork data”, we mean the state space basedon the perfect information provided by the simulator and simi-larly, with “vision based data” we mean the state space whichis based on the data provided by the noisy Vision system. Partof the challenge of learning preconditions is to work with thisimperfect data.
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Arm Joint angles:
Q0: 10.890
Q1: -111.960
Q2: -58.320
Q3: -102.330
Q4: 88.560
Q5: 17.280
Finger Distance: 
0.002
Object ID: 1 (Cup)
X:   0.652  Y:   -0.00217  Z:   0.313
RwX: 0.666  RwY:  0.00258  RwZ: 0.269
Roll: 90.4  Pitch: -0.031  Yaw: -75.5
RwRoll:131  RwPitch:-15.3  RwYaw: 107
Object ID: 2 (Box)
X:   0.679  Y:    0.0701   Z:  0.0825
RwX: 0.655  RwY:   0.101   RwZ:0.0391
Roll:  -148 Pitch: -84.2   Yaw:   167
Object ID: 3 (Tray)
X:   0.750  Y:    -0.285   Z:   0.0240
RwX: 0.728  RwY:  -0.285   RwZ:-0.0153
Roll:0.192  Pitch:-0.0702  Yaw:   -179
RwRoll:-88  RwPitch:0.00629 RwYaw:90.0
RwRoll:-161 RwPitch:16.0   RwYaw:90.6
Figure 4. Illustration of the simulated world (screenshot on the left) containing the robot arm and the 3 household items used in experiments (Cup, Cereal Box andTray); the camera is positioned to the left of this image, producing the texlets which can be seen in the rightmost screenshot above. The adjoined textshows the complete state space of the robotic system. Values prefixed with “Rw”, such as “RwX” come direct from RobWorkSim, whereas values such as“X” are the result of the vision system operating on the texlets.
3.4. Experiments
3.4.1. Example 1: The SupportOur first example is where the robot pulls the tray (means action)in order to bring an object supported by it (in this case the cup)into reach (goal). In some cases this will not work, because thecup (or whatever supported object is desired) might not be fullyon the tray. The learner’s task is to recognise the situationswhere the means action is effective. Figure 5 illustrates a scenewhere the desired cup is initially out of reach, but the robotsuccessfully brings it into reach by pulling closer the supporton wich the cup is standing. The robot then can successfullygrasp the cup.
3.4.2. Example 2: The ObstructionIn “the obstruction” scenario there are two objects in the scene;the cereal box and the cup. The cup is the object that the agentwants to grasp, but the cereal box is obstructing the reach (butnot the view). The desired object is therefore not reachable. Inspecific situations, e.g. as illustrated in Figure 6, pushing oneobject sideways (the box) may render the other object (the cup)graspable. The learner’s task here is to recognise situationswhere pushing the obstruction sideways will allow the desiredobject to be grasped.
3.4.3. Pretraining the preconditions of schemasBefore learning the above preconditions, we need to endow thesystem with some initial schemas. These preliminary schemasare essential because, for example, if one considers the taskof gathering training data for recognising the support situation,the system needs to pull the support, and the resulting situationneeds to be labelled; i.e. we need to know if the desired object
Figure 5. This figure illustrates how the robot brings into reach the initially outof reach cup by pulling closer the tray on which the cup is standing.
was reachable after pulling the support; hence the reachableprecondition needs to be learnt first. The motor programs ofthese initial schemas were handcoded, while the pre- and post-condition were trained. These initial schemas are purely forsingle actions and are not trained with any knowledge of theirapplicability in means-end combinations.We did this for three schemas:
(1) Grasp(o): reaching and grasping an object o when unob-structed (e.g. the cup),
(2) Push(o): reaching and pushing an object o (e.g. the box),
7
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Figure 6. Illustration of one object (box) obstructing another (cup)
(3) Pull(o): reaching and pulling an object o (e.g. the tray),
where o is a parameter for the object.We also trained one handmade abstraction to recognise “the ob-struction”; this recognises if one object is obstructed by another(e.g. the cup obstructed by the cereal box). The three schemaswere trained by trying out each schema on a set of randomisedenvironments.The Grasp(Cup) schema precondition was trained on 3000 train-ing examples out of which 1500 were successful reaches for thecup and 1500 were unsuccessful reaches. The trained schemaprecondition was tested on a validation set with 7862 examples(3931 successful/3931 unsuccessful). On this validation set theschema precondition achieved a classification success of 99.16%correct classifications using the RobWork data for training. Us-ing Vision based data for learning the classification success was99.13% correct classifications.The Push(Box) schema precondition was trained on 2200 train-ing examples (1642 successful/558 unsuccessful). The validationset contained 376 examples (284/92). On this validation set theschema precondition achieved a classification success of 89.63%.Push(Box) was only trained with RobWork data. The relativelylow performance is due to fewer training examples.The Pull(Tray) schema precondition was trained on 3000 train-ing examples (1500/1500). The validation set contained 4380examples (2190/2190). On this validation set the schema pre-condition achieved a classification success of 92.51% correctclassifications using the RobWork data for training. UsingVision based data for learning the classification success was91.69% correct classifications. Note that this is merely recog-nising situations where the tray can be pulled, and says nothingabout the means-end behaviour of “the support”.The obstruction recognising abstraction succeeded in about 93%
of its classification trials. It was trained on 5879 examples(3329/2550) and tested against 997 examples (898/99). Again,this was only done with RobWork data, not Vision based data.All Precondition classifiers and abstraction recognisers weretrained using simple feed forward Neural Networks. They allhad 6 input neurons and one hidden layer with 10 Neurons. Theoutput layer was a single Neuron which was trained to outputeither 0 or 1 for predicted fail/success accordingly. The neuronsused Sigmoidal activation functions and the training algorithmused was RPROP using cross entropy error instead of the usualroot mean squared error.
3.4.4. Generating Data and TrainingExperiment 1 is with the support: We generated 6,453 positionsfor support and cup, and then pulled the support to see if thecup would come into reach. The outcome was that 83% of exam-ples were negative (the cup did not come into reach), and 17%positive.Experiment 2 is with obstructed scenarios: We generated 16,361scenarios with random positions for the cup and box, and thenpushed the box (obstacle) to see if it would convert an obstructedscenario to and unobstructed one. The outcome was that 94%of examples were negative (the cup was still unattainable afterexecuting the push action), and 6% positive. This is probablyqualitatively in line with typical real-world experiences, in thatpositive examples of configurations where the pushing of oneobject makes another accessible are relatively rare, for everydaytoys and household objects in everyday spatial relationships.Using this labelled data, we trained classifiers to predict situa-tions where a “remove obstruction” or “pull support” means-endbehaviour would work. The support classifier was separatelytrained twice (to compare results): once with the direct Rob-Work data for object position and orientation, and once using theVision System’s data. In the experiments with RobWork data,the preconditions (for such things as “reachable”, see Sec. 3.4.3)learnt from RobWork data were used. For the experiments withvision data, the preconditions learnt from vision data were used.The obstruction classifier was only trained on direct RobWorkdata. We initially experimented with both logistic regressionand neural networks for classification. The neural networksproved to be vastly superior and so we did not produce graphsfor the logistic regression with all different training schedules.(The advantage of logistic regression is speed of training.)We experimented with a range of networks and determined thata single hidden layer of 9 nodes was optimal. The training algo-rithm was RPROP [24, 25]. A validation set of 4380 examples(50% positive, 50% negative) was randomly selected. Existingwork [26] shows that learning can be problematic when nega-tive examples greatly outnumber positives; for this reason wealso randomly selected a balanced set (50% positive, 50% neg-
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ative) of training examples from the entire data.
3.5. Certainty Based Curiosity
The problem of learning of preconditions grows in difficulty withthe size of the state space; hence it is of considerable difficultyin our 3D world with a 6 DOF arm. Given a very large set oftraining data, the determination of the precondition might befacilitated, but infants seem to learn from relatively few exam-ples. For this reason we have looked at techniques which theprogram can use to select the training data which might be mostuseful. It does seem likely that infants use a similar techniquebecause they do not select actions at random, but rather havesome intrinsic motivations to prefer certain actions in certainsituations.Certainty Based Curiosity [27] is a strategy to bootstrap thelearning process so that schema precondition and predictionperformances converge faster to their maxima. This bootstrap-ping is achieved by trying to perform the schema which ismost likely to benefit from the experience. In every state eachschema’s precondition returns a value between 0 and 1. A 0corresponds to the class “failure” where the schema is expectedto be unable to achieve its goal when executed in the currentstate. A 1 corresponds to the class “success” where the schemais expected to achieve its goal when executed in the currentstate. Thus, the precondition implements a standard classifier,in this case with Sigmodial output between 0 and 1. If theoutput of the precondition classifier lies close to 0 or 1, thenthe classifier seems to be certain about the outcome. E.g. 0.01means there is no point in even trying and 0.99 means it will al-most certainly work. If, however, the classifier output lies closeto 0.5, then the classifier is not sure about the outcome. In fact,a output of exactly 0.5 means there is a 50% chance for eitheroutcome, failure or success. This means the classifier is unableto predict the schema’s failure or success with any confidencein the current state. In this case executing the schema is likelyto generate experience which the classifier will benefit from.Training examples were processed in batches of ten; i.e. eachschedule trained with ten random examples initially, and there-after made its selection for the next ten based on its currentclassifier filtering the remaining examples. The network wastrained on the examples according to the following schedules:
· Random: random selection of next samples.
· CBC (Certainty Based Curiosity): select the training ex-amples whose current predicted classification lies in therange 0.3 to 0.7 (i.e. uncertain classification). If no train-ing examples remain in this range a random selection ismade.
· Ranked CBC: Sort all remaining samples according to
how close their classification is to 0.5, and pick the nextsamples from the top (closest to 0.5) of the list.
· 0.2 epsilon greedy CBC: similar to ranked, but with 0.2percent chance to pick a random sample. (0.2 was pickedbecause in previous tests [27] this had given the bestresults.)
In each case an average was run over 50 complete trials (withdifferent randomly initialised neural networks) to smooth results.The idea behind the Certainty Based Curiosity approach to ac-tion selection would mean that we should place the agent inrandom situations and let it choose its actions guided by Cer-tainty Based Curiosity (CBC). However in our work we havesimply gathered all the training in advance from a random dis-tribution of positions, and the CBC’s role is to select the most“interesting” examples at each iteration of training. We expectto see that in the CBC guided runs the schemas converge totheir best performance faster than in random walk runs. Thiswas our hypothesis in advance of running the experiments; theactual results are described in the next subsection.
4. Results
Firstly we were able to learn the precondition of schemas (seeFig. 8). For the simpler schemas the precondition’s accuracyapproached 99%. For the more complex newly acquired means-end schema of bringing the cup into reach, the precondition’saccuracy approached 81%. The support is a very difficult spa-tial relationship to learn (which is also true for infants [7]). Theleft image in Figure 7 shows an example of a scene which theprecondition successfully learned to classify as a state in whichpulling the support will bring the cup into reach. The rightimage in Figure 7 shows an example of a scene which the pre-condition successfully classified as a state in which this will notwork.
Figure 7. This figure illustrates two different cases where the precondition wassuccessfully trained to predict whether pulling the support will bringthe cup into reach. For the scene in the left image it learned that itis possible, for the scene in the right image it learned that it is notpossible.
Using the realistic Vision based data to learn the precondition
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we were able to achieve similar accuracy as with the perfectnoise-free RobWork Simulator data. Fig. 8 compares the per-formance of RobWork based learning with Vision based learningfor three schemas: Grasp Cup, Pull Support and Pull Supportto bring the cup into reach. However it is worth noting that thedirect RobWork based learning achieved high accuracy muchfaster than the Vision based learning, as can be seen by com-paring Fig. 10 and Fig. 12, which are showing the same learningproblem with the only difference being that Fig. 10 uses the vi-sion system.
Figure 8. The Graph shows the accuracies of the preconditions for the threeschemas Grasp Cup, Pull Support and bringing the cup into reach.It can be seen that Vision based learning performs almost as well asthe RobWork based learning. 3000 training samples were used.
Secondly we looked at the influence of the different schedulesby which training examples are selected on the learning rates oflearning the preconditions. Figure 9 shows pulling the supportand Figure 10 shows pulling the support to bring the cup intoreach. The preconditions are first learnt with 10 random samples(which gives a performance little better than chance (50%)). Theset of training samples is then step by step increased by 10samples, using one of the different selection schedules describedin Sec. 3.5, and used for relearning the precondition.
The graphs show that learning preconditions with reasonableaccuracy is possible from a moderate amount of training data(e.g. 500 samples). The graphs also show that learning fromrandom samples performs better than using more directed sched-ules. These results are unexpected as we showed that directedschedules can perform better than random in a previous pub-lication [27]. Figures 11 and 12 show how a directed sched-ule outperformed “random” in our previous experiments for twomeans-end schemas: Pull support to bring cup into reach and
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Figure 9. Learning Rates of different sample picking schedules for pulling thetray, using input data from the computer vision system. The differentschedules for the four graphs are described in Section 3.5. Pre-condition accuracy is on the y-axis and number of samples on thex-axis.
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Figure 10. Learning Rates of different sample picking schedules for pulling thetray with a cup on top, in order to bring the cup into reach, usinginput data from the computer vision system. The different sched-ules for the four graphs are described in Section 3.5. Preconditionaccuracy is on the y-axis and number of samples on the x-axis.
push a cereal box away to unobstruct the cup. The discrepancyis probably due to the higher noise in the data of the experi-ments using the vision system. Kääriäinen [28] showed that anyactive learner has a lower bound of Ω〈 η2ε2 〉 on the sample com-plexity. The Ω-notation [29] is related to the more commonlyused O-notation, but where the O-notation describes an upperbound, the Ω-notation describes an lower bound (i.e. the bestcase when it comes to the sample complexity in active learning).The noise in the data is represented by η and ε describes theclassification error. This means when η is large active learn-ing can not outperform random sampling. In fact, the oppositecan be the case. This is, because the most informative sam-ples active learning is trying to find, also tend to be the mostnoise-prone [30]. That means that the learning algorithm has
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Figure 11. Learning Rates of E-Greedy and Random sample picking in theUnobstruct Cup Case using perfect input data direct from the sim-ulator (i.e. no computer vision system).
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Figure 12. Learning Rates of E-Greedy and Random sample picking in the PullSupport Case using perfect input data direct from the simulator (i.e.not using computer vision system); note that this is the same graphas Fig. 10 except this one does not use the vision system.
to use very noisy samples for learning and cannot even relyon the less informative but also less noisy samples from fur-ther away from the decision boundary which a random samplingwould provide. This explains why the random sampling outper-forms the directed sampling when using the noisy vision baseddata. Selecting more noisy samples would lead to worseningperformance for the classifier.
5. Discussion
We have shown that learning preconditions for schemas is pos-sible with reasonable accuracy using a few hundred trainingexamples. We also show that with many thousands of experi-ences, it is possible to learn preconditions with very high accu-racy. In order to try to reduce the number of training samplesrequired we experimented with different active learning strate-gies for choosing the next training samples. Previous resultsusing data directly from the simulator suggested that using adirected schedule produced faster learning. However, our re-sults here using the vision system within the simulator suggestthat schedule where the learner chooses randomly from the setof available experiences produces marginally better results thana directed schedule. This disparity in results is probably dueto the high degree of noise within the vision data.We are interested to discuss here the similarities and differencesbetween what our system learns and what infants learn in the 6to 11 months period. However, we first must point out that weare not attempting to create a model of an infant with our work.Our computational system is significantly simpler than an in-fant, and even if some correspondence might be achieved in whatthey learn, this would in no way imply that there was a corre-spondence in the implementation. We do not believe it wouldbe fruitful to “replicate” the detail of the results of an infantstudy by building a computational system which could producesimilar data points to that produced by the infants, because theimplementations would be so different that the computationalmodel would shed no light on how infants operate. However weare interested in copying the developmental trajectory of infants,and tackling similar problems in a similar ordering to infants,because we believe that infant developmental trajectories cangive a useful ordering of tasks and competences from easy tohard, where subsequent ones build on previous acquisitions.Now we compare what our system learns and what infants learnin the 6 to 11 months period. One point worth noting is thatthere have been only a handful of systematic studies analysinghow infants acquire the means-end behaviours for the support orobstruction scenarios. While we have some studies which probethe competence at a particular age [31–33], Willatts’s [6] goesfurther and tracks the change during the period of transition;he studied the acquisition of the support over the 6 to 8 monthsperiod, and analysed eye-gaze (to determine if the infant in-tentionally pulled the support in order to retrieve the supportedobject, or just to play with the support). This showed that acci-dental retrieval gradually becomes intentional. However, thereare still a lot of unknowns about the infant’s progression; e.g. itwould be beneficial for a roboticist to see a systematic study ofthe situations where the infant classifies correctly or incorrectly,right up to 11 months. Such studies are not easy to carry out
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as one needs a lot of access to the infants to test them very fre-quently. We are left then with studies which are more anecdotalthan systematic, such as Piaget’s [2, 7]. In general these showthat infants learn fairly rapidly from a few examples, althoughthe studies have not monitored every waking hour of the infants,so we do not know how many examples they try while nobodyis looking. Notwithstanding this we can point out some defi-nite major differences between our learning and infants: infantshave some complex background knowledge which they apply tothis problem, largely present as early perceptual competences[34]. There are many potentially useful abstractions in percep-tion which the infant may be using, such as paying particularattention to edges of objects, or the area between two objects.Infants may also have biases to give priority to certain infor-mation when learning about causality for example. In additionthere are numerous potential sources of knowledge which theinfant could be bringing to bear on the problem of understand-ing when the support works or not; e.g. the infant has priorexperience of pushing objects on surfaces and feeling the fric-tional resistance [13], the infant has prior knowledge of howinanimate objects are not supposed to move unless caused tomove by some contact [35], the infant has experinece of grav-ity and how one object presses on the object underneath. Weare not sure if any of these sources are in fact used by the in-fant learning the support, but they are available. Our artificialsystem by comparison is very ignorant about the world, and islearning with very little background knowledge, apart from itsability to segment objects and analyse relationships betweenthe information extracted about distinct objects. Our system islearning purely from this fairly low level perceptual data; thisperceptual data is more limited than what the infant has, andthe infant additionally has more sources of other information thtit might potentially use. This would explain why infants couldlearn with fewer examples.
Theoretically we can also discuss the relationship between our“differentiation” and Piagetian assimilation and accommodation.In Piaget’s accounts [2, 7] most phenomena in infancy involveelements of assimilation and elements of accommodation (rarelyis something pure assimilation or pure accommodation), and dif-ferentiation is no different. These two processes will apply tothe motor part as well as the sensory part (precondition) of theschema, although the present paper has only focussed on thesensory part. When a schema is about to be differentiated, suchas the schema for pulling being differentiated to “pull support”,there is initially assimilation because the new phenomenon isseen as similar to the behaviour of pulling, and so the pullingschema is used as a basis for the new schema. There is alsoan element of accommodation because it is recognised that theschema needs to be adjusted (accommodation); this adjustment(accommodation) happens over a longer timescale than the orig-
inal assimilation, because extensive training data needs to begathered about support relationships before an accurate clas-sifier can be trained. Overall accommodation is the dominantprocess in differentiation, because it is essentially a change toa cognitive structure, however the initial assimilation to someschema which will act as a basis is also crucial. This is a littledifferent to some other descriptions of assimilation and accom-modation in computational works. Some neural network modelsinterpret assimilation as the changing of weights in the networkwhereas accommodation is used for changes to the architecture(e.g. new connections) [36]. We find this interpretation a lit-tle too narrow, as Piaget’s notion assimilation would seem toapply even if weights are not changed and a network can beused “as is” to classify; also Piaget’s notion of accommodationwould seem to apply where any change is made, and chang-ing the weights in a network can lead to radical changes inwhat it would recognise. An example closer to ours is the re-inforcement learning system of Tommasino, et al. [37]. Theyalso clearly separate the two processes and use assimilationto apply to the case where an existing expert can be used “asis”, whereas they use the term accommodation where an expertwith similar sensorimotor mappings is used as a basis and thenmodified. Under our interpretation we would say that the lattercase has an element of assimilation because of the choice ofan expert with similar sensorimotor mappings; ultimately thiscomes down to how people interpret Piaget’s writings and whathe meant with these two terms; this issue of varying interpre-tations is also mentioned in the same paper by Tommasino, etal. [37]. The idea of building a library of schemas (or re-usingexisting “experts”) also entails a number of interesting problemsrelated to assimilation and accommodation which we have notaddressed here, for example how should the choice be made be-tween adjusting an existing skill or creating a new one? Howcan the context be used to decide which new situations can betackled by existing skills? (See also [38]).
5.1. Comparison with related work
Apart from the work of Rosman and Ramamoorthy [8] which wediscussed in the introduction, we have not found a related workwith which we can make a direct comparison, however severalworks are less directly related. Our work could be describedas autonomously learning planning operators, for which thereis some related work in AI [15, 39–41]; Chaput [15] learns newoperators via a self-organising map which looks at vectors ofall sensor values before and after an action; this was effectivein the scenario they used with a small number of binary sen-sors, but it would not easily scale to larger state spaces. Thework of Mourao et al. [41] learns action effects for a robot ma-nipulation scenario. The sensor abstractions are provided (e.g.
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predicates such as “object x is in object y”) and the systemlearns which predicates become true after the action is per-formed. Their predicates are predefined whereas in our workwe want the state space to develop over time, so that the agenteffectively invents new predicates (such as the spatial relation-ship defining the support relation). Mugan and Kuipers’ work[40] is somewhat close in that they do not need to predefinepredicates and can autonomously find regions within variables;however compared to this we need the ability to learn a widerclass of possible preconditions, for example those that involverelationships among variables.
Work on learning “affordances” is quite close to ours; Ugur etal. [42] learns affordance predictors for behaviours by learningthe mapping from the object features to discovered object effectcategories. These predictors can then be used by an agent tomake plans to achieve desired goals. This work is quite similarto ours in that essentially it boils down to classification; i.e.once effect categories have been clustered Ugur et al. use aclassifier to learn the mapping from the initial object features tothese effects. They use SVMs where we use neural networks.At a conceptual level a difference in the approaches concernswhat drives the learning of a classifier. In Ugur et al.’s work thedecision about what effects a classifier should be learned foris dictated by the choice of features which the agent has beengiven as its perceptual world. In our work the decision aboutwhich action effects to learn a precondition for is dictated bywhether those action effects facilitate other subsequent actionswhich were previously impossible. We would speculate that itis likely that infants combine both approaches.
One major claim we can make for our work relative to othersreviewed is that it seems to be one of the few works which tack-les these specific actual early infant means-end behaviours; i.e.the first means-end behaviours that infants acquire in the secondhalf of the first year. We are not aware of any other develop-mental robotics work which tackles the acquisition of the supportfor example. Some of the works reviewed above tackle domainsfar removed from infancy (e.g. Chaput’s forager [15]) or tasksmore advanced than what infants engage in the first year [41].As stated in the introduction, we believe that the acquisition ofearly means-end behaviours is of major importance to cognitivedevelopment because it is through these that infants begin togain a higher level understanding of the world, in this case bybeginning to take notice of important spatial relationships be-tween objects, which determine how they might behave undermanipulation. More generally we believe that the tasks, andordering, present in early infancy could be quite advantageousto follow because it leads through a developmental trajectoryfrom easy to difficult, with later acquisitions building on earlierones.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
In this work we have looked at the problem of learning theprecondition (and making it more accurate) for a newly discov-ered means-end behaviour. We have shown that learning thesepreconditions accurately takes rather a lot of training data, es-pecially when realistic visual input is used. When using thedata form our (noisy) vision system we have shown a slight ad-vantage to selecting training examples randomly rather than byan active learning strategy (which contradicted our previous re-sults using noiseless data direct from the simulator). It could beexpected that using more detailed and accurate vision informa-tion (not just the position and orientation) may well reduce thenoise and make an active strategy more appropriate.Our approach is quite naive in that it looks at rather crudeparameters extracted from the visual data, such as position andorientation, which lose most of the detail of the surfaces of theobjects involved and their spatial relationships. In future workwe intend to make use of more detailed visual data so as toenable the system to more accurately learn the precise spatialrelationships between objects which determine the success ofvarious means-end actions which require objects to be in specialrelationships (which is very relevant to tool use for example).In future work we would also like to collaborate with psychol-ogists studying infants to learn more about the order in whichinfants acquire various stages of competence in their learningof the support and other means-end behaviours. For example,we know from Uzgiris and Hunt’s studies that although an 8month-old can successfully pull a support (as a means to re-trieve an object), the necessary spatial relationship (on top of)is not understood, and up until 10 months or later the infantwill still pull a support even if the desired object is held aboveit and not touching it [31, p.111], or resting on an object close tothe support. We would like to see a rigorous testing of a widevariety of borderline support cases to determine where infantsmisclassify the support relationship, and how this changes from8 to 11 months.Another aspect to consider is the different sources of knowledgeand the order in which infants develop skills for successfullyusing a tool such as the support, and develop their perceptualskills for recognising the causal relationship when they see itused by someone else. Schlesinger and Langer’s results showthat causal perception develops later than the (action) skill forusing the support [33]. If developing robots are to follow thetrajectory of infant development this suggests that the empha-sis should be firstly on their own exploratory actions with thetool, rather than learning purely from observation. HoweverSchlesinger and Langer think it unlikely that causal activity isthe only determinant in the development of infants causal per-ception, and further research could help to elucidate the poten-
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tial contributions of other sources of knowledge. For examplelinguistic sources of knowledge may also be important. It isclaimed that language input may influence category formationas early as 3 months [43], however it is not clear at what agelanguage influences the formation of concepts of spatial rela-tionships such as those dealt with in this paper. Research hasshown that 5-month-old infants’ categorisation of spatial rela-tionships was not influenced by the language they were exposedto, but by adulthood the extent to which their native languagemarked these spatial relationships altered their sensitivity tothese concepts [44]. It remains unclear at what age the languagebegan to influence the developing spatial relationship concepts.Casasola showed the influence of language on 18-month-oldslearning to categorise the support relationship [45]; interest-ingly her study showed that 18-month-olds failed to categorisesupport situations, which is surprising given that they would bythis time have spent more than half their lives knowing how touse a support in a means-end activity; it suggests that when thecontext of the task is different infants do not necessarily draw onthe knowledge they might have available in another context (i.e.the context of acting to achieve a goal). Other studies exam-ining how linguistic terms for spatial relationships are learnedhave also shown the difficulty of transferring what is learned inone context to another; they have shown that experience of con-crete interactions with the objects facilitate the learning, andalso that abstract artificial objects provide situations in infantslearn poorly, instead infants require objects with functionallyrelevant properties [46]. In summary significant further researchwould be required to elucidate the contributions of all the po-tential sources of information that an infant might use to learn aspatial relationship, and the additional difficulties provided byvarying contextual aspects.
If we step back from the details and look at how the prob-lem tackled here fits into the big picture of the mechanisms ofdevelopment, we see that finding preconditions is one way tofind new abstractions over states. The preconditions of means-end behaviours are particularly interesting because they tendto capture spatial relationships among objects (e.g. the meansobject and the goal object). It is conceivable that sensory ab-stractions discovered in this way could subsequently be used todynamically extend the state space of a cognitive system, so thatit adds new higher level state variables. Each time the statespace is looked at, the cognitive system can take the base vari-ables from the simulator and extend them step by step with allabstractions found so far. This mechanism may lay a foundationfor future work on ongoing emergence by emulating Mandler’smechanism of Perceptual Analysis [47]. Newly discovered ab-stractions could be thought of as emergent symbolic elementsin the system. Our long term goal is to create a developmen-tal AI system that evolves from subsymbolic space to symbolic
reasoning by finding/creating symbols on its own.
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